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INTRODUCTION
Dating back to the early decades of the twentieth century, the
United States Supreme Court has articulated clear, venerable
in
standards for the waiver of constitutional rightS2-and
for
both
is
a
rich
area
particular the right to counsel. This
litigation and teaching, if only to be able to repeat phrases such as
"courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" and
"we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental

2

See, e.g., Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.

506 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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rights."3 A defendant must proceed with "eyes open," 4 and a
waiver will not be presumed from a "silent record."5 Consistently
affirmed and reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court and
lower state and federal courts, these are cornerstones of our
system of criminal justice.
However, a significant corpus of cases has developed that
allows, under certain circumstances, a "forfeiture," an "implicit
waiver," or a "waiver by conduct" of the right to counsel.6 Given
the scrutiny courts have extended to "knowing and intelligent"
waivers of the right to counsel,7 this is contradictory, if not
troubling. These cases-from both federal and state appellate
courts and the lower courts generating the litigation-seem to be
in direct contravention of United States Supreme Court precedent
on this matter. Under that jurisprudence, a defendant has an
unequivocal right to certain information before a waiver is found,
and a demand (contemporaneously and on later inquiry) for an
unequivocal and intelligent relinquishment of those rights.8 This
newer "implicit waiver" bypasses that inquiry for a defendant who
later finds himself without protection-or an attorney, for
example-without having expressly decided to forego counsel's
representation. 9
A particular line of cases addressing circumstances unique to
the stress of a trial has created the doctrines of forfeiture and
implicit waiver of trial counsel.' 0 A defendant, for example, may
3 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. U.S. ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1943)).
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966) (knowing and voluntary waiver of
Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to incriminate himself); see, e.g., Faretta,
422 U.S. 806 (knowing and voluntary waiver of Sixth Amendment right to counsel);
Johnson, 304 U.S. 458 (knowing and voluntary waiver of Sixth Amendment right to
counsel).
6 Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516 ("The record must show, or there must be an allegation
and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and
understandingly rejected the offer.").
7 Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Johnson, 304 U.S. at
464.
8 Adams, 317 U.S. at 279.
9 See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
1o Commonwealth v. Means, 907 N.E.2d 646, 658 (Mass. 2009) ("Forfeiture is an
extreme sanction in response to extreme conduct that imperils the integrity or safety of
court proceedings.").
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constructively waive the right to trial representation by agitating
his lawyer, court personnel, or others in such a way as to
deliberately delay or derail the trial."
There is very little formal literature on this topic, although a
very recent online ABA Journal has drawn attention to it in a
fairly sensational way.12 Otherwise, a survey of law reviews and
other secondary literature reveals little explanation or insight.' 3
The United States Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed
the constitutionality of the waiver by conduct, constructive waiver,
or forfeiture doctrines or the processes by which courts apply
them.' 4
This project began with an attempt to define, describe, and
disambiguate forfeiture from implicit waiver/waiver by conduct,
and to discuss the rationales and policies behind why these
doctrines have emerged (yet highlighting the reasons why
criminal defendants might reasonably attempt to disrupt the
process). Many of these court opinions explore puzzling,
contradictory definitions of both the terms and application of the
doctrines. But as the survey produced more and more shades of
gray, sifting the doctrines and approaches became less interesting
than looking beneath them for the analytical assumptions and
legal underpinnings of these doctrines.
Ultimately, however, what may be most useful to courts and
practitioners, as well as students of this area of the law, are ideas
for avoiding the circumstances that bring such cases to the state
11 United States v. Green, 388 F.3d 918, 921 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995); Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278
(1st Cir. 1976).
12 Martha Neil, Reportedly Stabbed in Neck by Client With Pencil During Court
Hearing, Lawyer Stays on Case, A.B.A. J. (May 10, 2011, 11:26 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/stabbed-in-neckby-client-with-pencil-during
court hearing-lawyerstays.on_.
13 After an exhaustive search of scholarly essays, journals, and notes on the topic,
only three appear to be relevant to the idea of implicit waiver or a forfeiture of counsel
through conduct. See Jodie L. Carlson, State v. Jones and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing:

When is a Defendant's Behavior Bad Enough to Result in Forfeiture of the Right to
Counsel?, 37

WM. MITCHELL L. REV.

819, 823-25

(2011);

Scott M.

McLeod,

Constitutional Law-Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel-Forfeiture of the Right to
Counsel in Tennessee, 78 TENN. L. REV. 589 (2011); Jeffrey P. Willhite, Rethinking the

Standards for Waiver of Counsel and ProceedingPro Se in Iowa, 78 IOWA L. REV. 205
(1992).
14

See infra Section III.
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and federal appellate courts. Take, for example, Davis v. Frazier,1s
which illustrates the stakes for the defendant, the possibility of a
full meltdown of the judicial process, and the vast expense (dare I
say waste) of resources as it has wound its way through habeas
and appellate courts for more than ten years.
Following his conviction for rape, child molestation, and
kidnapping in 2000, Mr. Davis was appointed counsel to assist
him in prosecuting an appeal, which included an allegation of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 16 He proceeded to compile a
lengthy list of appellate attorneys who endured a somewhat
contentious relationship with Mr. Davis, who frequently
demanded communication and visits from his attorneys. All six of
these attorneys eventually withdrew or were dismissed-some
because of Mr. Davis's complaints or behavior and others for
reasons completely unrelated to Mr. Davis.' 7 After his seventh
appointed attorney withdrew (listing receipt of an angry letter
from his client as his reason for doing so), the court informed
Davis that he would have to retain counsel privately or represent
himself.' 8 No hearing was ever held warning Mr. Davis that
complaints about or discord with his counsel might cause him to
lose his right to counsel.
Over strenuous objections, Mr. Davis finally conducted his
own Motion for New Trial hearing, which was subsequently
denied.' 9 He appealed pro se, lost, and then petitioned pro se for
certiorari (which was dismissed as untimely). Still pro se, he filed
a habeas petition in 2006 and appealed from that denial to the
Supreme Court of Georgia. That court, perceiving a cognizable
legal issue, remanded his case to the habeas court for the purpose
15 673 S.E.2d 215 (Ga. 2009); Davis v. State, 628 S.E.2d 374 (Ga. 2006); Davis v.
State, 615 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). This case is more than a mere illustration. I
served as pro bono counsel in Mr. Davis's first case in the Georgia Supreme Court
(after his pro se petition for certiorari was granted) and filed an amicus curiae brief on
his behalf when he faced the supreme court again on a discretionary review from the
denial of his habeas corpus petition. It is through my involvement in Mr. Davis's case
that I became aware of and interested in this issue. The circumstances relayed here
are, of course, limited to text from reported opinions and not to any privileged or
confidential information.
16 Davis, 673 S.E.2d at 216.
17 Davis, 615 S.E.2d at 206-07.
18 Davis, 673 S.E.2d at 216.
19 Id.
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of Mr. Davis being allowed to continue in his appeal-this time
with counsel. 20
Mr. Davis was convicted in 2000 and is only just now-in
2010-facing a motion for new trial with the assistance of counsel.
Since his trial, his case has journeyed through a pro se motion for
new trial, a pro se appeal, consideration on certiorari in the
Georgia Supreme Court, a state habeas petition, and a state
habeas appeal. 21 Would not a five-minute colloquy on the record,
warning Mr. Davis of the dangers both of continuing his
disruptive conduct and proceeding pro se, have been more
judicially efficient than nearly ten years of appellate and postconviction litigation?
It clearly would have been more efficient, and some
jurisdictions require these sorts of warnings before counsel can be
waived or forfeited by conduct. Other states and federal circuits,
however, do not require special warnings, hearings, or other
process before criminal defendants are forced to proceed without
counsel. This Article attempts to not only catalogue jurisdictional
approaches to this problem but to consider the values and
principles underlying the variety of approaches on the subject.
And while no one-size-fits-all answers will magically clarify
puzzles that have perplexed a number of state and federal
appellate judges, there is enough of a problem here to warrant
some study, organized thinking, and perhaps even modification of
existing approaches.
I. WAIVERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, GENERALLY

A. The Right to Counsel and Waivers Thereof
Though it has not always been so, the right to appointed
counsel for indigent defendants is now a bedrock of the U.S.
judicial system. 22 The assistance of counsel has always been
understood to be "of fundamental character" and after Gideon v.

Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 216.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides that:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
20
21
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Wainwright23 and Alabama v. Shelton, 24 states are required to
provide competent counsel to defendants facing even the
possibility of a prison or jail sentence.
Because counsel's assistance is so elementary-from meeting
the state's evidence to navigating important choices through the
process of a criminal case-there is a "[presumption] that the
defendant requests the lawyer's services at every critical stage of
the prosecution." 2 5 And, consistently, the law is clear that in order
to sustain a waiver of a constitutional right-including the right
to counsel-the "record must show, or there must be an allegation
and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but
intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less
is not waiver."2 6
Put a little differently, "The Sixth Amendment withholds
from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has
or waives the assistance of counsel." 27
The inquiry, by now is universal and standard: Was the
defendant informed that the right to counsel existed?2 8 Did he
waive that right understanding what he was losing? 29 Do court
records reflect both the information and the intelligent, voluntary
waiver? 30 If the answers to these questions are "no," then most
United States Supreme Court precedent-at least as related to the
23

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

24

535 U.S. 654 (2002).
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986), overruled by Montejo v.

25

Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
26 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 504, 516 (1962).
27 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (emphasis added).
28 Shafer v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 637, 648 (8th Cir. 2003) ("[A] trial court cannot
accept a defendant's mere assurance that he has been informed of his right to counsel
and desires to waive it.").
29 United States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95, 109 (1st Cir. 2002) ("A defendant who
seeks to relinquish her right to counsel must so state in unequivocal language. . . . The
waiver must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.... The trial judge must explicitly
make the defendant 'aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so
that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with eyes open."').
30 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465 ("The constitutional right of an accused to be
represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the
accused-whose life or liberty is at stake-is without counsel. This protecting duty
imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining
whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.").
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waiver of the right to counsel-prohibits a later finding of the loss
of that right.3 1
There are few exceptions to this, and those are at least
practical under the circumstances. For example, although criminal
defendants have the right to effective court-appointed counsel, it
is also within their rights to waive this right or to choose to
represent themselves. 32 Faretta explained the right, co-existent
with the right to representation, to dispense with counsel and
navigate the process pro se. 33 However, courts are not required to
inform every defendant of his right to self-representation, and
before it is permitted, the court must confirm that he "knowingly
and intelligently" gives up "the traditional benefits associated
with the right to counsel." 34 As with a general waiver of the right
to counsel, before a defendant is permitted to proceed pro se,35 the
law requires that the defendant is "made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made

31 Beyond the right to counsel or to self-representation,
waivers of other
constitutional rights must also be made knowingly and voluntarily. For example,
jurisprudence on the waiver of the right to trial is similarly clear and iron-clad. See
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) ("Ignorance, incomprehension,
coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of
unconstitutionality."). In order for a guilty plea to be found valid on later inquiry, a
criminal defendant must fully understand both the meaning and consequences of that
plea. Id. at 242. To ensure that a criminal defendant waives his constitutional rights
with "eyes wide open," before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must apprise a
criminal defendant of the constitutional rights that are being waived: (1) the right
against self-incrimination, (2) the right to a jury trial, and (3) the right of
confrontation. Id. at 243.
32 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.
Frechette, 456 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 88 (2d
Cir. 1997); Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057, 1065 (11th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 1982).
35

See Frederic Paul Gallun, The Sixth Amendment Paradox:Recent Developments

on the Right to Waive Counsel Under Faretta, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ.
CONFINEMENT 559 (1997) ("Almost sixty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized the
risks of pro se representation and stated that the Framers based the Sixth Amendment
on 'a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have
the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with
power to take away his life or liberty.'").
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with eyes open."' 36 Some jurisdictions have added further factors
to the general Farettatest, such as warning a defendant about the
technical problems a defendant may face or the risks of
unsuccessful pro se litigation.3 7 This must all take place in open
court and on the record, as "[t]he right to assistance of counsel and
the correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help are not legal
formalisms" but are protected by the Sixth Amendment.3 8
"Shadow" or "standby counsel" is frequently afforded after
counsel is waived in a Farettahearing. The beginnings of the use
of shadow counsel-more usual in federal court than in state
courts-may reach back to dicta in the Faretta decision itself.39
Although the appointment of "standby" or "shadow" counsel is a
topic for an entire article-indeed, it has been-it merits a
discussion here. Many jurisdictions-seeming uncertain of how to
approach a difficult or delaying defendant-will take this middle
path.
In its discretion, a court may appoint standby or shadow
counsel to a defendant-even over his objection. 40 "Standby
counsel acts as a safety net to insure the defendant receives a fair
trial and to allow the trial to proceed without the undue delays
likely to arise when a defendant represents him- or herself."41

36 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (internal citations omitted). But see Trials: Right to
Counsel, 39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REv. CRIM. PROC. 507, 519 (2010) ("However, the right to
proceed pro se is not absolute. A judge may reject a defendant's request to proceed pro
se if the request is untimely and may terminate self-representation if the defendant
lacks sufficient mental capacity to conduct his defense without representation, or is
unable to abide by the rules of procedure or courtroom protocol.").
37 Welty, 674 F.2d 185.
38 Faretta,422 U.S. at 815-16 (quoting Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,

279 (1942)).
39 Id. at 806 (explaining that a court may, in its discretion, terminate selfrepresentation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist
misconduct and appoint "standby counsel" to aid the accused).
40 Michael J. Kelly, Making Faretta v. California Work Properly: Observations and
Proposalsfor the Administration of Waiver of Counsel Inquiries,20 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 245, 262 (2005) ("Most of the problems with standby counsel relate to the
decision of the trial court to appoint counsel. Finally, the right to waive counsel can be
'effectively denied' if appointed standby counsel interfere in the pro se defendant's case
in any way. Thus, while standby counsel can benefit the defendant, problems may
cause 'animosity between standby counsel and the defendant."').
41 21A AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw § 1160 (2011).
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B. The Foundationsof Constructive Waivers, Implicit Waivers,
and "Forfeiture"of the Right to Counsel
Courts' treatment of non-explicit waivers of counsel (whether
styled as constructive waiver, waiver by conduct, implicit waiver,
or forfeiture) is the main focus of this Article. We know a
defendant can waive counsel knowingly and voluntarily after
having received a Faretta warning. But-although various
jurisdictions define the circumstances differently-nearly every
state and circuit has a mechanism by which a defendant may be
forced to proceed pro se without having elected to represent
himself (or at least not in the same way anticipated in Faretta).
As background, however, it is useful to discuss the firstknown cases in this area and historical treatments of these
circumstances. The forfeiture/implicit waiver cases seem to stem
from a few related but distinct roots of cases: cases relating to a
delaying defendant; cases relating to a disruptive or potentially
violent defendant; 4 2 and cases in which a defendant at some point
expresses a wish to defend himself (but who later changes his
mind about self-representation).
Cases as early as the 1940s reflected courts' frustrations with
clients perceived to be derailing the process by delaying hiring
counsel. 43 Courts have long held that a defendant does not have
an unrestricted right to counsel of his own choosing. But what is
the appropriate remedy if a defendant does not secure an
attorney's representation in advance of a trial?
The foundation for the current body of case law related to
forfeiture or waiver by conduct may also have been laid in cases
related to a client's disruptive presence in the courtroom. A series
of United States Supreme Court decisions addressed this problem

42 See, e.g., United States v. Travers, 996 F. Supp. 6, 17 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (finding
forfeiture as a result of the defendant's "persistently abusive, threatening and coercive"
dealings with his attorney and noting that the defendant had been repeatedly warned
that his failure to cooperate could result in a finding of forfeiture).
43 See, e.g., Spevak v. United States, 158 F.2d 594, 596 (4th Cir. 1947) ("It seems
clear that an accused who is able to employ counsel and fails to do so after being
afforded opportunity, thereby waives the right and may not urge lack of counsel as
excuse for delay.").
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in the early 1970s and concluded that a defendant could lose his
constitutional right to presence through his conduct. 44
So while it is difficult to fully trace the origins of the
doctrines of implied/constructive waiver or forfeiture of counsel, it
appears that they emerged at the intersection of cases allowing
the loss of a constitutional right to presence during a trial (for
disruptive conduct) and the potential loss of counsel after a refusal
to hire an attorney. Only a handful of appellate opinions on the
subject pre-date the early 1970s, but beginning in the 1980s,
perhaps as courts began to smooth out any procedural wrinkles
after Gideon, litigation and opinions on these subjects expanded
remarkably. What we have now is a jumble of cases from nearly
every state supreme court and federal circuit court of appeals that
cover a broad range of defendants' behavior and various
responses.
The McLeod 45 and Goldberg46 opinions are the earliest ones
that offer more than a passing discussion of the underlying
problems. But even in those cases (and those citing them), it is
difficult not to become mired in the terminology. 47
Forfeiture, according to Goldberg, can result in the complete
deprivation of counsel (though often limited to proceedings other
than a criminal trial) and is permitted in circumstances of
extreme disruption of the criminal trial proceSS 48-USually if a
14 See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 345-46 (1970).
46 United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322 (11th Cir. 1995).
46 United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092 (3d Cir. 1995).
4
See infra Section II.
4
These circuits and states recognize the doctrine of forfeiture: Second Circuit
(Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001)); Third Circuit (United States v.
Leggett, 162 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 1998)); Sixth Circuit (Gray v. Moore, 520 F.3d 616 (6th
Cir. 2008)); Eighth Circuit (United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2003));
Eleventh Circuit (United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322 (11th Cir. 1995)); Alaska
(Gladden v. Alaska, 110 P.3d 1006 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005)); Arizona (State v. Rasul, 167
P.3d 1286 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)); Arkansas (Beyer v. State, 962 S.W.2d 751 (Ark.
1998)); California (King v. People, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)); Colorado
(People v. Alengi, 148 P.3d 154 (Colo. 2006)); Delaware (Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758
(Del. 2006)); Idaho (State v. Lindsay, 864 P.2d 663 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993)); Illinois
(People v. Tucker, 889 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)); Indiana (Jackson v. State, 868
N.E.2d 494 (Ind. 2007)); Maryland (Felder v. State, 666 A.2d 872 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1995)); Massachusetts (Commonwealth v. Means, 907 N.E.2d 646 (Mass. 2009)); New
York (People v. Smith, 705 N.E.2d 1205 (N.Y. 1998)); North Dakota (City of Grand
Forks v. Corman, 767 N.W.2d 847 (N.D. 2009)); South Carolina (State v. Roberson, 675
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defendant threatens his attorney with violence. In some
jurisdictions, forfeiture is a potential consequence when a
defendant engages in dilatory or other tactics to stall the legal
process. 4 9
Commonwealth v. Means50 also explains that the federal
courts, and several state courts, recognize the doctrine of
"forfeiture."5 From a review of a number of forfeiture cases, the
Massachusetts court concluded that there are four considerations
that relate to whether forfeiture is appropriate: (1) forfeiture is
typically applied in cases where a defendant had more than one
appointed counsel; (2) forfeiture is rarely applied to deny a
defendant representation during a trial but rather at other stages
of a criminal matter; (3) forfeiture may be an appropriate response
to a defendant's threats or acts of violence against defense counsel
and others; and (4) forfeiture should be a last resort response to
only the gravest and most deliberate misconduct. 52
Means further distinguished between forfeiture, waiver by
conduct (abandonment), and waiver (voluntary waiver).5 3
Goldberg also differentiates: while forfeiture involves extreme
behavior-with violence or threats of violence being the baseline of
the inquiry-waiver by conduct, implicit waiver, and constructive
waiver (used interchangeably in this Article and in most
authority) involve a lesser form of disruption. 54
In circumstances less egregious than threatened or actual
violence, but which are still disruptive to the criminal process, a
number of states and circuits recognize or allow an "implicit
waiver" of counsel.5 5 This waiver by conduct more usually requires

S.E.2d 732 (S.C. 2009)); Tennessee (State v. Holmes, 302 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. 2010));
Utah (State v. Pedockie, 137 P.3d 716 (Utah 2006)); Washington (City of Tacoma v.
Bishop, 920 P.2d 214 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)); Wisconsin (State v. Cummings, 546
N.W.2d 406 (Wis. 1996)).
4 Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1094 ("[Tlhere are circumstances in which the dilatory
tactics of a defendant can amount to a forfeiture of his right to counsel.").
50 907 N.E.2d 646 (Mass. 2009).
51 Id. at 659.
52 Id. at 659-60.
53
54

Id. at 656-59.
Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101.

55These circuits and states recognize the doctrine of implicit waiver: Fifth Circuit
(United States v. Davis, 269 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2001)); Sixth Circuit (King v. Bobby,
433 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2006)); Seventh Circuit (United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693
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a warning-though not necessarily in a hearing or colloquy-and
continued behavior may be treated as an implied request to
proceed pro se and, thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel. 56
It is these two methods of conduct amounting to waiver that
is the focus of this Article-whether it is consistent with
constitutional principles, what "warnings" are sufficient, and what
behavior may be deemed sufficiently egregious. Before a
defendant can be deemed to have "waived" his right to counseleither through constructive waiver or forfeiture-many
jurisdictions require that he had been given at least some warning
about the consequences of his actions. More specifically, in some
jurisdictions,
before a judge finds that a defendant has forfeited his right to
counsel and imposes the extreme sanction of denying an
indigent defendant the assistance of counsel at trial or
otherwise, she must first conduct a hearing at which the
defendant has a full and fair opportunity to offer evidence as
to the totality of the circumstances that may bear on the
question whether the sanction of forfeiture is both warranted
and appropriate.5 7
For the purposes of this Article, however, it is the
jurisdictions that do not require a hearing or colloquy before
(7th Cir. 1992)); Eighth Circuit (United States v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir.
2007)); Ninth Circuit (United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2007));
Eleventh Circuit (United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2008)); Alabama
(Harris v. State, 27 So. 3d 582 (Ala. 2008)); Arizona (State v. Hampton, 92 P.3d 871
(Ariz. 2004)); Colorado (People v. Alengi, 148 P.3d 154 (Colo. 2006)); Florida
(Waterhouse v. State, 596 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 1992)); Georgia (Jones v. State, 536 S.E.2d
511 (Ga. 2000)); Hawaii (State v. Maelega, 88 P.3d 1208 (Haw. 2004)); Idaho (State v.
Lindsay, 864 P.2d 663 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993)); Kentucky (Depp v. Commonwealth, 278
S.W.3d 615 (Ky. 2009)); Maine (State v. Watson, 900 A.2d 702 (Me. 2006)); Maryland
(Felder v. State, 666 A.2d 872 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995)); Rhode Island (State v. Snell,
892 A.2d 108 (R.I. 2006)); Tennessee (State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516 (Tenn. 2000));
Utah (State v. Pedockie, 137 P.3d 716 (Utah 2006)); Washington (City of Tacoma v.
Bishop, 920 P.2d 214 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)); Wisconsin (State v. Cummings, 546
N.W.2d 406 (Wis. 1996)); Wyoming (Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567 (Wyo. 2000)).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that
failure to hire counsel where defendant has financial ability to do so constitutes a
waiver by conduct), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 882 (1992); United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d
1577, 1579 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that the district court properly treated defendant's
dilatory conduct as request to proceed pro se).
51 Commonwealth v. Means, 907 N.E.2d 646, 652 (Mass. 2009).
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denying a defendant his right to counsel that may be most
interesting-because of a potential conflict with Faretta and
jurisprudence protecting the right to counsel.
II. SURVEYING THE LANDSCAPE OF WAIVER AND FORFEITURE BY
CONDUCT
Because of the lack of broad or comparative information on
the doctrines of forfeiture and constructive waiver of counsel, this
Article will lay out the variety of practices and conditions the
circuit courts and state courts have addressed. Most jurisdictions
have confronted the scenario described in the Introduction in one
way or another, but as described previously, the terminology
describing forfeiture, implicit waiver, and waiver by conduct is
intertwined and ambiguous.
Some courts use different terminology to describe the same
conduct (or court response), other courts appear to use the terms
synonymously, and still others attempt to make distinctions
among definitions. From the Third Circuit's United States v.
Goldberg case, a fundamental opinion on the subject, readers gain
no more insight to the doctrine despite lengthy discussion and
attempted differentiation between forfeiture and traditional or
implicit waiver.58 Forfeiture is used when a court is not referring
to an intentional waiver of rights, and Goldberg explains the
importance of defining both "waiver by conduct" and "forfeiture,"
since appellate review of alleged Sixth Amendment violations may
depend a good deal on the applicable doctrine and procedure.5 9
There, forfeiture is defined in the lack of intentionality of a waiver
(triggered by extreme conduct); however, other jurisdictions
require a hearing or warning before finding "forfeiture," just as
many do not require a hearing before finding implicit waiver or
waiver by conduct. On the other side of this problem are cases
such as State v. Lindsay,60 an Idaho case from the mid-1990s,
58 Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092. "Unlike waiver, which requires a knowing and
intentional relinquishment of a known right, forfeiture results in the loss of a right
regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and irrespective of whether the
defendant intended to relinquish the right." Id. at 1100.
59 Id. at 1101.
60 864 P.2d 663 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993). The court ostensibly discusses waiver by
conduct, not forfeiture as established in Goldberg, which was decided and became so
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which uses the terms synonymously. 6 1 The problem with using the
terms interchangeably, however, is that each has become a term of
art in other jurisdictions, though even the terminology varies in
definition across jurisdictional lines. 62
It is useful, however, to become aware of the range of
approaches and court reasoning, even if analytically there is little
to gain from naming approaches differently or organizing a survey
according to terminology. The language, in the end, does not
matter. The result (and legal analysis leading to that result)
means a great deal. Because, in these circumstances, courts have
gone to great lengths to discuss a defendant's offending behavior
(ranging from complaints to threats to physical violence) to match
the required procedural approaches, this survey tracks a
defendant's behavior rather than the court terminology for that
behavior. Comparing apples to apples (or dilatory tactics to
dilatory tactics), the conversation then becomes more useful and
reveals sharp divisions among judicial responses, state supreme
court opinions, and a federal circuit split on the issue.

A. Delay and "DilatoryTactics": Approaches and Procedures
State and federal courts have developed a variety of
approaches to defendants who attempt to delay, or otherwise
derail, the process toward a trial, including postponing the
retention of counsel or failing to cooperate with appointed counsel.
While some courts require that trial courts thoroughly warn
defendants of the possible repercussions (which may include being
forced against their will to proceed pro se), others ensure that
defendants receive and assent to this warning (in the form of a

influential after the opinion in this case. This conflicting terminology, however,
occasionally persists in jurisdictions that have not explicitly adopted the forfeiture
doctrine of the Third and other federal circuits.
61 Id. at 667 (stating that the defendant "impliedly waived or 'forfeited' that right
[to counsel] by appearing at the . . . hearing without an attorney after having been
given the opportunity to retain one").
62 See, e.g., Harris v. State, 27 So. 3d 564, 573 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (conflating
implied waiver with forfeiture of the right to counsel); Beyer v. State, 962 S.W.2d 751,
755 (Ark. 1998) (finding that a defendant "forfeits" his right to counsel by delaying
trial); People v. Alengi, 148 P.3d 154 (Colo. 2006); People v. Tucker, 889 N.E.2d 733,
736-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) ("[D]efendant ... in an attempt to delay trial and thwart the
effective administration of justice may forfeit his right to counsel of choice.").
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colloquy or dialogue with the court), and still others require no
warning at all. A number of jurisdictions have not encountered
this problem at the appellate level and are therefore not included
in this discussion. 63
1. Jurisdictions Requiring a Warning or Hearing Before a
Defendant Can Lose His Right to Counsel Through Delay
The approach seemingly most consistent with other
precedent related to waivers of a constitutional right requires a
hearing, transcribed and on the record in open court, before a
defendant may lose his right to counsel as a result of his behavior.
In fact, several cases and states' approaches, though
described as a waiver or forfeiture by conduct, may be more
accurately described as a waiver by inaction-the failure to make
a decision, to retain counsel, or the like. 6 4 A Sixth Circuit case
illustrates this well. As in many other cases described here, the
defendant first delayed retaining counsel, then was appointed
standby counsel who later attempted to withdraw. The court's
ultimate decision in that case reflected its reasoning that by
rejecting all options other than self-representation (even after
receiving minimum Faretta warnings), the defendant had
effectively "chose[n] self-representation." 65
Circumstances of delay frequently occur around a defendant's
financial inability to retain counsel despite not qualifying for a
public defender's services. Even in these cases, so long as a
defendant has been warned of the consequences, courts are
empowered to find a waiver or forfeiture of counsel and his trial

63 This could be the case for a number of reasons: the issue has not occurred in that
jurisdiction (unlikely), the issues have not been selected for review in appellate courts,
or the issues have otherwise not percolated their way into an appellate opinion.
64 See Alengi, 148 P.3d at 160 (finding that defendant forfeited his right to
counsel-after explicit warnings from the court-even though he made no deliberate
decision to forgo that right); City of Tacoma v. Bishop, 920 P.2d 214, 217 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1996) (appellate court requires Farettawarnings and a colloquy about "the nature
of the charge, the maximum penalty, and technical rules that he must follow" when a
defendant fails to retain counsel or delay a trial); Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567 (Wyo.
2000) (holding that a "waiver of counsel by conduct is not knowingly and voluntarily
made when the criminal defendant has not been warned that waiver will be the result
of his continued dilatory and obstructive behavior").
65 King v. Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 485-86, 492 (6th Cir. 2006).
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may proceed without a defense attorney's participation.6 6 This is
often described as a "delay" problem, though the real problem is
likely one of financial reality when a criminal defendant finds
himself caught between the poverty line and his available line of
credit. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits similarly require a hearing
before a defendant loses his right to counsel, though that right can
be lost (presuming it is lost knowingly and after appropriate
warnings) for failure to retain counsel. Neither circuit requires a
"sacrosanct litany"6 7 when explaining the risks of both failure to
retain counsel and the risks of continuing without representation,
but appropriate and thorough information is required in all cases.
The reverse of this circumstance involves cases in which a
defendant complains about his counsel's performance-often to
the level of requesting or demanding new counsel. Some of the
appellate opinions examining such situations focused on the level
of the defendant's understanding and perceived manipulation of
the system. In two such cases, certiorari was denied after an
appellate court upheld a finding of waiver/forfeiture without a full
warning or hearings. In State v. Carruthers,the Supreme Court of
Tennessee similarly held that "an indigent criminal defendant
may implicitly waive or forfeit the right to counsel by utilizing
that right to manipulate, delay, or disrupt trial proceedings."6 8
Finding that Carruthers' conduct and dilatory behavior had
escalated with the successive appointments of new counsel, and
that he understood the dangers of proceeding without counsel, the
appellate court explained "in situations such as this one, a trial
court has no other choice but to find that a defendant has forfeited
the right to counsel; otherwise, an intelligent defendant 'could

< City of Grand Forks v. Corman, 767 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D. 2009) ("This right to
be represented by counsel may be waived or forfeited, but first the district court must
inform the defendant of the right and afford a reasonable opportunity for the defendant
to secure counsel."); see also Alengi, 148 P.3d at 161-62.
61 United States v. Davis, 269 F.3d 514, 519-20 (5th Cir. 2001) (defendant was not
sufficiently warned of the risks of proceeding pro se and so there was not a knowing
and intelligent waiver of counsel when failing to retain counsel); United States v.
Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) (minimum Farettawarnings required before a
defendant may lose his right to representation after repeated failure to retain counsel).
68 35 S.W.3d 516, 549 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001). On the other
hand, that court opined that "the distinction between these two concepts is slight" and
found both forfeiture and waiver in that case. Id.
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theoretically go through tens of court-appointed attorneys and
delay his trial for years."' 69
Previously, the Kentucky Supreme Court7 0 established
bright-line requirements for a Faretta inquiry, but this approach
was later rejected in favor of a more practical and flexible
approach that looked to the entire record to see if the defendant
has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.71 The
Kentucky Supreme Court has extended its pragmatic, flexible
approach by recommending the model inquiry from the
Benchbook 72 but leaving open the possibility of determining
sufficiency of the waiver of the right to counsel by other meansessentially holding that a Faretta inquiry is still a technical
requirement, but that the form the inquiry takes cannot be
prescribed.73
In addition to requiring a hearing on the subject, some courts
have found a way to further warn a defendant that his continued
behavior will result in the loss of representation even when a
defendant does not indicate a decision to expressly or verbally
waive that right. A Missouri appellate court case has advised trial
courts to prepare a written notice of waiver even where the
defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is said to be implied by
his conduct. 74 In recommending the written waiver of counsel
"out of an abundance of caution," the court urged trial court judges
to present the waiver to the defendant to sign so that any refusal
to sign is on the record. 75
69 Id. at 550 (quoting State v. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d 406, 419 (Wis. 1996)).
70 Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221 (Ky. 2004).
71 Depp v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.3d 615, 617-19 (Ky. 2009).
72 Section 1.02(C) of the Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges provides district
court judges with guidance on how to handle defendants who wish to represent
themselves. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES
§ 1.02(C) (4th ed. 2000). Namely, there is a list of fourteen suggested questions the
judge should ask the defendant. See United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1267 n.8
(11th Cir. 2008) (suggesting the questions as a form of model inquiry); United States v.
McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 366 (6th Cir. 2004) (using the questions as a model inquiry to
which other inquiries should be substantially similar); United States v. Peppers, 302
F.3d 120, 136 (3d Cir. 2002) (recommending the questions as guidelines for inquiry).
But see United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he catechism in
the [Benchbook] . . . is not part of the sixth amendment.").
73 Commonwealth v. Terry, 295 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Ky. 2009).
74 State v. Wilkerson, 948 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
75 Id. at 445.
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Each of these procedures is entirely consistent with
constitutional jurisprudence on knowing and intelligent waivers.
They acknowledge the dilemma of disruptive or dilatory behavior
but hold that even in these problematic circumstances, a warning
of some sort must be given to the defendant as though he had
walked into court announcing his desire to proceed without a
lawyer.
2. Jurisdictions Recommending-Not Requiring-a Hearing
Before a Finding of Implicit Waiver
A number of cases have held that a hearing in circumstances
of implicit waiver of the right to counsel is not required, but the
courts recommend an on-record hearing as the preferred
mechanism to determine the validity of a defendant's waiver of
the right to counsel.
In United States v. Garey, the Eleventh Circuit explained
that "the best practice is for district courts to begin by attempting
to engage the defendant in a full discussion of the dangers of selfrepresentation whenever a defendant expresses a desire to waive
his right to counsel, whether affirmatively or by his conduct."76
The court distinguishes here between a dialogue or colloquy with
the defendant and a mere warning, holding that a warning is
sufficient, though an on-record colloquy is preferable.7 7
In Maine, a defendant may waive his right to counsel by
causing a delay or by obstructing the court process without having
first been warned, but only under unusual circumstances. 78
Though a waiver apart from an in-court warning should be
unusual, "[a] defendant's 'stubborn failure' to hire counsel or apply
for court-appointed counsel .. . may form the basis for a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver if the court also finds that the

7
540 F.3d 1253, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (adding that "[a] dialogue
cannot be forced; therefore, when confronted with a defendant who has voluntarily
waived counsel by his conduct and who refuses to provide clear answers to questions
regarding his Sixth Amendment rights, it is enough for the court to inform the
defendant unambiguously of the penalties he faces if convicted and to provide him with
a general sense of the challenges he is likely to confront as a pro se litigant").
7 Id. at 1269-70.
7
State v. Watson, 900 A.2d 702 (Me. 2006).
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defendant fully understood the right to counsel and the dangers of
79
self-representation apart from the court's Farettawarnings."
Utah has a similar approach. 80 The Utah Supreme Court
noted, however, that the case presented was "a prime example of
the confusion and inconsistency that can permeate proceedings in
the absence of an explicit warning and colloquy regarding the
right to counsel." 8 '
3. When a Hearing is Not Required or Recommended After
Dilatory Conduct
Not all jurisdictions, however, require that trial courts warn
defendants in a hearing or colloquy-many have held that it is
sufficient if the "entire record" demonstrates that the defendant
understands the risks of continued dilatory or obstructionist
behavior. As discussed above, most courts recommend a hearing or
colloquy of some sort before a waiver is found, but some
jurisdictions have failed to even recommend a hearing under
circumstances of dilatory or other difficult conduct.
In Georgia, the supreme court has made clear "that it is not
incumbent upon the trial court to make each of these inquiries
[relating to the nature of the charges, the range of allowable
punishments, potential defenses and mitigating circumstances,
and any lesser included offenses]."8 2 So long as the record as a
whole reflects that a defendant understands these matters, a
hearing may not be required before he loses his right to counsel. 83

Id. at 712 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
State v. Pedockie, 137 P.3d 716, 724 (Utah 2006) ("While we have urged that
trial courts engage in an on-the-record colloquy with defendants to ensure that they are
aware of the dangers . . . of self-representation, we have not imposed an absolute
requirement that they do so.").
81 Id. at 725; see also United States v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1101, 1105-06 (8th Cir.
2007) (a defendant's waiver will be upheld if either "(1) the district court adequately
warns the defendant about the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se or (2)
the record as a whole demonstrates 'that the defendant knew and understood the
disadvantages of self-representation.' An on-the-record colloquy is . . . recognized as the
(quoting Gladden v. State, 110 P.3d 1006
preferred [but not required] method .
(Alaska Ct. App. 2005))).
82 Jones v. State, 536 S.E.2d 511, 513 (Ga. 2000).
83 See Harris v. State, 27 So. 3d 582 (Ala. 2008); People v. Tucker, 889 N.E.2d 733
(Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
79

80
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In these cases, absence from one's trial seems to complicate
both the analysis and the outcome. In a South Carolina case
complicated by the defendant's absence from his trial, the court
found a waiver by conduct of the right to counsel "inferable" from
the defendant's actions and "[found] . . . Farettainapplicable to the

instant case." 84 Formalistically finding that since the defendant
had not indicated that he wished to proceed pro se, Farettadid not
apply. This is true, of course, but the jurisprudence of waiver
leading to Faretta went unexamined.86 Likewise, the defendant's
absence seems to be a dispositive factor in Indiana's consideration
of the implicit waiver issue. 86
B. The Loss of Counsel After Defendants' "EgregiousConduct"
1. States Which Do Not First Require a Hearing
Some jurisdictions do not require a hearing before a
defendant loses his right to representation as a direct and
immediate result of "egregious behavior"-usually actual or
threatened violence. The theory, perhaps, is that the defendant's
behavior is so extreme as to make a hearing inappropriate, or that
some behavior is automatically understood to justify waiver. Yet
these jurisdictions define "egregious" along different points of a
spectrum and make no clearer differentiation between the need
for counsel at pre-trial or trial proceedings than any other
jurisdictions discussed herein.
In Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, the Second Circuit acknowledged the
doctrine and analyzed it along the line of cases allowing forfeiture
of presence at trial (rather than along the line of Farettaand its
progeny). In that case, the court concluded that hearings and
warnings are not constitutionally required in forfeiture
circumstances, 8 7 which are typically triggered by violence or
84 State v. Roberson, 675 S.E.2d 732, 733 (S.C. 2009).
85 Id. at 733-34.
86 Jackson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. 2007). "[The court] cannot expect a trial
court to hunt down a defendant to admonish him about the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation if the defendant has made no indication to the trial court that he
intends to proceed pro se and then subsequently does not show up for trial." Id. at 501.
87 Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2001). "Here, however, given the
Supreme Court's recognition that other important constitutional rights may be
forfeited based on serious misconduct, we cannot say that the state courts were
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threats of violence. Similarly, in United States v. Leggett, the
Third Circuit found a valid forfeiture of counsel-without
requiring a hearing-when the defendant punched, attacked, and
spat upon his attorney. 88 Further, when the defendant in United
States v. Thompson threatened to kill his appellate attorney, the
Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court's finding that he had
forfeited-without a hearing or warning-his right to counsel.8 9
Just as one begins to believe that physical violence might be
the hallmark of "egregious conduct" that always leads to an
immediate forfeiture of counsel, there is a twist in the authority.
Consider the Delaware Supreme Court's explanation that
"[v]iolence is not the sine qua non of extremely serious
misconduct," such that so long as the conduct is "sufficiently
egregious, it will constitute forfeiture."90 This can occur regardless
of whether the defendant has received a warning indicating that
his actions could lead to a forfeiture or the disadvantages of
proceeding as a pro se litigant. Similarly, another intriguing
approach is a hybrid forfeiture procedure, requiring a hearing in
the "gray area" sorts of cases and conduct. For example, in
California's King v. Superior Court, readers learn that "in
instances where the misconduct does not rise to the most serious
level, a warning should be given. The warning will serve to alert
the defendant to the seriousness of his misconduct and perhaps
unreasonable in determining that the right to counsel could be forfeited based on
petitioner's physical assault on his attorney." Id.
88 162 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 868 (1999). The
defendant's "unprovoked physical battery" of his counsel qualifies as the type of
"extremely serious misconduct" meriting a forfeiture of the right to counsel, "regardless
of the defendant's knowledge thereof and irrespective of whether the defendant
intended to relinquish the right." Id.; see also People v. Smith, 705 N.E.2d 1205 (N.Y.
1998) (finding waiver of right to counsel where defendant threatened his attorney
exclaiming that, if convicted, he would put a knife in the attorney's head).
89 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1134 (2004). "A criminal
defendant may, however, by virtue of his actions forfeit his constitutional rights." Id.;
see also United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325 (11th Cir. 1995) (defendant engaged
in "pervasive misconduct" that was egregious enough to warrant forfeiture of the right
to counsel); State v. Rasul, 167 P.3d 1286, 1289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) ("Forfeiture, only
appropriate in cases of 'severe misconduct or a course of disruption aimed at thwarting
judicial proceedings,' does not require a prior warning.").
90 Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 765-66 (Del. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 363 (3d Cir. 2004)); see also Gilchrist, 260 F.3d at 100 ("[W]e do
not mean to suggest that any physical assault by a defendant on counsel will
automatically justify constitutionally a finding of forfeiture of the right to counsel.").
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forestall future misconduct."91 In King, however, the defendant
(who did receive a warning) had grabbed his first attorney and
threatened a second, and there is little guidance given about how
"serious misconduct" might be defined.
2. Loss of Counsel Through Egregious Conduct Possible After a
Hearing
One of the most recent-and more comprehensiveexplorations of this appears in Commonwealth v. Means. 92
Forfeiture, it explains, should be a "last resort" response to only
the "grave[st] and [most] deliberate" misconduct, "in light of the
fundamental constitutional rights at stake."9 3 Means emphasized
both that "denying an indigent defendant the assistance of counsel
at trial or otherwise" is an "extreme sanction," and that the
appropriate response is "a hearing at which the defendant has a
full and fair opportunity to offer evidence as to the totality of the
circumstances that may bear on the question whether the sanction
of forfeiture is both warranted and appropriate." 94
In Bultron v. State, Delaware's key forfeiture case, the court
makes clear that, "the trial judge must first give certain warnings"
-in both waiver and waiver by conduct cases-"before a trial
court may determine that a defendant has waived his right to
counsel and must proceed pro se."9 5 The court further clarified,
citing to both Faretta and Goldberg, "to the extent that the
defendant's actions are examined under the doctrine of 'waiver,'
there can be no valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel unless the defendant also receives Farettawarnings." 96

91 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 585, 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The court further stated:
Balancing the great importance of the right to counsel against the need to
protect counsel and the orderly administration of justice, we conclude an
accused may forfeit his right to counsel by a course of serious misconduct
towards counsel that illustrates that lesser measures to control defendant are
insufficient to protect counsel and appointment of successor counsel is futile.
Id. at 588.
92 907 N.E.2d 646 (Mass. 2009).
9 Id. at 652, 660.
9 Id. at 652.
9 897 A.2d 758, 764 (Del. 2006).
96 Id. (quoting United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995)).
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Tennessee falls into this category as well, requiring a hearing
(at which the defendant is present and permitted to testify) before
forfeiture can be found.9 7 Notably, that state classifies an attack
upon counsel as "serious misconduct" but not necessarily as
"extremely serious misconduct sufficient to warrant forfeiture of
counsel at trial without prior warning."9 8
Gray v. Moore very explicitly took on the reasoning that
underlies other jurisdictions' acceptance of the Allen-GilchristMcLeod cases allowing forfeiture without a warning or hearing.9 9
"[I]n light of the explicit language used by the Supreme Court," it
explained, "we conclude that the Ohio appellate court
unreasonably applied Allen when it affirmed Gray's removal
despite the absence of a prior warning by the trial court." 0 0
However, "no action against an unruly defendant is permissible
except after he has been fully and fairly informed that his conduct
is wrong and intolerable, and warned of the possible consequences
of continued misbehavior." 0 1 Further, the Sixth Circuit declined
to accept a true forfeiture doctrine as established in cases like
Gilchrist and McLeod because the defendant had not exhibited
behavior that was extreme enough to warrant a sanction without

a warning as required by Illinois v. Allen. 1 0 2
C. Concluding Tallies and Synthesis of the Cases and Splits
After a thorough review of the available appellate cases,
circuit and state splits as related to courts' procedures regarding a
9 Another case espousing similar tenets, but not discussed here in detail, is United
States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that defendant implicitly
waived his right to counsel after being warned he would lose the right if he persisted in
sabotaging his relationships with his attorneys).
98 State v. Holmes, 302 S.W.3d 831, 847 (Tenn. 2010). The court stated:

We do not imply by our decision in this case that a criminal defendant may
not be found to have forfeited his right to counsel in the absence of a physical
assault. A forfeiture (or an implicit waiver) may withstand constitutional
scrutiny where, for instance, a defendant repeatedly threatens harm to his
lawyer and/or his lawyer's family and it is apparent that the defendant has
the ability to deliver on his threats.
Id. at 847 n.10.
99 520 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2008).
100 Id at 623.
101

Id.

102

397 U.S. 337, 346 (1970).
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defendant's delay or "egregious conduct" come into relief, Of
course, some jurisdictions do not recognize either of the doctrines
of forfeiture or waiver by conduct, 0 3 while others have no
authority for one doctrine104 or the other.10 5
Of the jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine of forfeiture or
the loss of counsel after the manifestation of "egregious conduct,"
a number of these states10 6 and federal circuits 0 7 require a
defendant to have been warned in a court hearing. One example of
this approach is illustrated by Commonwealth v. Means, which
requires a "full and fair opportunity" to be heard before a court
may impose "the extreme sanction of denying an indigent
defendant the assistance of counsel." 0 8
On the other hand is Delaware's rule, which unapologetically
allows for an immediate loss of counsel "[i]f a defendant's behavior
is sufficiently egregious" (whatever that may mean) and requiring

1o3 An exhaustive search revealed that the following are jurisdictions that do not
recognize the loss of counsel through either egregious or dilatory conduct: First Circuit,
Fourth Circuit, Tenth Circuit, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West
Virginia.
104 After an exhaustive search, the following jurisdictions presented no appellate
court authority recognizing the loss of counsel through dilatory conduct: Second
Circuit, Ninth Circuit, California, Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, and North
Carolina.
105 A similarly thorough search revealed no appellate court authority for the loss of
counsel through egregious conduct in the following jurisdictions: Fifth Circuit, Seventh
Circuit, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
106 These states require a hearing, warning, or colloquy before removing counsel
from a defendant who engages in egregious conduct: Delaware (Bultron v. State, 897
A.2d 758, 765 (Del. 2006)); Massachusetts (Commonwealth v. Means, 907 N.E.2d 646,
658 (Mass. 2009)); New York (People v. Smith, 705 N.E.2d 1205, 1208 (N.Y. 1998));
Tennessee (State v. Holmes, 302 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. 2010)).
107 The Sixth Circuit (Gray v. Moore, 520 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir. 2008)) and Ninth
Circuit (United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 954 (9th Cir. 2007)) require a hearing,
warning, or colloquy before removing counsel from a defendant who engages in
egregiousconduct.
108 907 N.E.2d 646, 652 (Mass. 2009).

464

MISSISSIPPILAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 81:3

no "Farettawarnings or a warning to discontinue disruptive
conduct." 0 9
The Second, Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits do not
require a hearing, warning, or colloquy before removing counsel
from a defendant who engages in egregious conduct.1 10 Several
states also follow this approach,"1 ' and this creates both a circuit
and state split on procedures related to egregious conduct.
Similarly, related to a defendant's persistent inaction, delay,
or failure to retain counsel, some jurisdictions, such as the
Eleventh Circuit, hold "in some instances a defendant's conduct
will reveal a voluntary decision to choose the path of selfrepresentation over the continued assistance of counsel" and "[s]o
long as a defendant knows the risks associated with selfrepresentation, it is irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether
his understanding comes from a colloquy with the trial court, a
conversation with his counsel, or his own research or
experience.""12 The Third Circuit" 3 and a number of states114
have followed this approach.
109 Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 765 (Del. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 363 (3d Cir. 2004)).
110 See United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 2003); Gilchrist v.
O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 250 (3d
Cir. 1998); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 324-25 (11th Cir. 1995).
nM These states do not require a hearing, warning, or colloquy before removing
counsel from a defendant who engages in egregious conduct: Arizona (State v. Rasul,
167 P.3d 1286, 1289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)); California (King v. Superior Court, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 585, 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)); New York (People v. Smith, 92 N.Y.2d 516, 521
(N.Y. 1998)); North Carolina (State v. Montgomery, 530 S.E.2d 66, 69 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000)).
112 Jones v. Walker, 540 F.3d 1277, 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2008).
us The Third Circuit does not require a hearing, warning, or colloquy to remove
counsel from a defendant for dilatory conduct. See United States v. Kosow, 400 F. App'x
698, 702 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 2004).
114 These states do not require a hearing, warning, or colloquy to remove counsel
from a defendant for dilatory conduct: Alabama (Harris v. State, 27 So. 3d 582, 586
(Ala. 2008)); Alaska (Gladden v. State, 110 P.3d 1006, 1011 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005));
Georgia (Jones v. State, 536 S.E.2d 511, 513 (Ga. 2000)); Illinois (People v. Tucker, 889
N.E.2d 733, 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)); Indiana (Jackson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 494, 503
(Ind. 2007)); Maine (State v. Watson, 900 A.2d 702 (Me. 2006)), North Carolina (State
v. Montgomery, 530 S.E.2d 66, 69 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)); Pennsylvania (Commonwealth
v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173 (Pa. 2009)); Rhode Island (State v. Snell, 892 A.2d 108, 120
(R.I. 2006)); South Carolina (State v. Roberson, 675 S.E.2d 732, 733 (S.C. 2009)); Utah
(State v. Pedockie, 137 P.3d 716, 722 (Utah 2006)); Wisconsin (State v. Cummings, 546
N.W.2d 406, 418 (Wis. 1996)).
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Other state courts, such as those in Colorado and Delaware,
have a vastly different practice.1 15 Allowing for the possibility of a
waiver triggered by disruptive conduct, Colorado makes clear that
"[a] defendant may waive assistance of counsel either expressly or
impliedly through his or her conduct."116 However, citing
presumptions against the waiver of a constitutional right,
appellate courts make clear that trial courts have a duty "to make
a careful inquiry about the defendant's right to counsel and his or
her desires regarding legal representation.""17 In Delaware, a
"'waiver by conduct' requires that a defendant be warned about
the consequences of his conduct, including the risks of
proceeding pro se.""t8 This stands in contrast to Delaware's rule
that forfeiture may be imposed for violent or especially outrageous
behavior (without warnings, colloquy, or a hearing).119 Likewise,
in contrast to those identified above, a number of federal circuits
have made the same determination: counsel may not be lost
without an in-court inquiry on the subject of whether the
defendant understands the risks of his behavior and the risks of
proceeding without counsel.12 0

115 These states require a hearing, warning, or colloquy before removing counsel
from a defendant who engages in dilatory conduct: Arizona (Hampton v. State, 92 P.3d
871 (Ariz. 2004)); Arkansas (Beyer v. State, 962 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Ark. 2004));
California (King v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003));
Colorado (People v. Alengi, 148 P.3d 154, 159 (Colo. 2006)); Delaware (Bultron v. State,
897 A.2d 758, 764 (Del. 2006)); Florida (Waterhouse v. State, 596 So. 2d 1008, 1014
(Fla. 1992)); Hawaii (State v. Maelega, 88 P.3d 1208 (Haw. 2004)); Idaho (State v.
Lindsay: 864 P.2d 663, 666 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993)); Kentucky (Depp v. Commonwealth,
278 S.W.3d 615 (Ky. 2009)); Maryland (Felder v. State, 666 A.2d 872, 876 (Md. 1995)),
Massachusetts (Commonwealth v. Means, 907 N.E.2d 646, 652 (Mass. 2009));
Minnesota (State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2009)); North Dakota (City of
Grand Forks v. Corman: 767 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D. 2009)); Ohio (State v. Constable,
No. CA2003-12-107, 2005 WL 637792 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2005)); Tennessee (State
v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 549 (Tenn. 2000)); Washington (City of Tacoma v.
Bishop, 920 P.2d 214, 219 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)); Wyoming (Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d
567, 575 (Wyo. 2000)).
us People v. Alengi, 148 P.3d 154, 159 (Colo. 2006).
117 Id.
n1 Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 764 (Del. 2006) (citing United States v. Goldberg,
67 F.3d 1092, 1101 (3d Cir. 1995)).

Id.
120These circuits require a hearing, warning, or colloquy before removing counsel
119

from a defendant who engages in dilatory conduct: Fifth Circuit (United States v.
Davis, 269 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2001)), Sixth Circuit (King v. Bobby, 433 F.3d 483 (6th
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III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S... OPINION?
The United States Supreme Court has found no reason to
differentiate between a waiver of counsel expressed through words
and a waiver of counsel expressed through conduct-and its only
word on waiver of counsel requires a hearing and a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary relinquishment.
If examining Boykin, Faretta, and the "knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary" jurisprudence on the one hand, and this body of
forfeiture and implicit waivers on the other, something seemingly
does not quite fit with cases allowing a waiver without warning.
Those cases holding the same or similar view to the following-"A
'waiver by conduct' requires that a defendant be warned about the
consequences of his conduct, including the risks of proceeding pro
se" 1 2 1-seem the most constitutionally sound and allow trial
courts the flexibility of finding a forfeiture or waiver while still
protecting a defendant's rights. The United States Supreme Court
has not addressed the issue of the constitutionality of forfeiture or
of implicit waiver. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
recently acknowledged, "Although the Supreme Court has never
directly held that the right to counsel can be forfeited, the Court
has also never held to the contrary .".. ."122
While true, denial of certiorari, however, is difficult to
decipher. Traditionally, students of law learn the "orthodox view"
that the denial of certiorari is not an indication of the Court's view
on the merits of a case. 123 Some have been so glib as to suggest the
process as the product of a "a fit of absentmindedness" or a matter
of "serendipity." 12 4 The Court's own explanations include a
disclaimer that a denial of certiorari means only that "for
conflicting reasons which may have nothing to do with the merits
and certainly may have nothing to do with any view of the merits
Cir. 2006)), Seventh Circuit (United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1992)),
Eighth Circuit (United States v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 2007)).
121 Bultron, 897 A.2d at 764 (citing United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1101
(3d Cir. 1995)).
122 Chandler v. Blackletter, 366 F. App'x 830 (9th Cir. 2010).
123 See Peter Linzer, The Meaning of CertiorariDenials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227,
1228 (1979).
124 Book Review, The Uncertaintyof Cert, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1795 (1992) (reviewing
H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT (1991)).
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taken by a majority of the Court, there were not four members of
the Court who thought the case should be heard."125
In at least some instances, a denial of certiorari is a simple
way of affirming a lower court decision.126 However, it has also
been suggested that although it is wise practice to be wary of
attributing a decision on the merits to a denial of certiorari, denial
may offer tentative views on the merits that are helpful in
predicting the course of future developments. Denial may be
particularly meaningful if there are obvious factors that would call
for review if the lower court's decision seemed wrong. The most
useful of these factors are the apparent national importance of the
case denied review, the existence of a conflict in lower court
decisions, or the presence of a strong dissent from the denial of
review. 127
The problem with assuming this to be the case with forfeiture
or constructive waiver cases is that the Court has denied
certiorari in a number of cases standing for opposite propositions.
A number of legal teams have sought United States Supreme
Court review on related issues-all without success. The most
recent of these are described below, though as described in Section
I, the Court has denied certiorari in these issues since the early
1940s.1 28

A. Loss of Counsel Requiringa Hearing
Of the denials of certiorari discovered during research for this
Article, a number of these were in cases ultimately requiring some
sort of hearing on the record before a defendant was able to waive
counsel with his conduct. United States v. Bauer, for one, held that
Farettadid not preclude the concept of waiver by conduct so long
as a defendant receives minimal warnings on the record. 1 2 9
Applying similar reasoning, the Ninth Circuit in United States v.

125 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491-92 (1953) (Justice Frankfurter explaining the
position of the Court).
126 Linzer, supra note 123, at 1283-86.
127 Id. at 1304.
128 Spevak v. United States, 158 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1947).
129 United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
882 (1992). Under Faretta,the court was required to give the defendant warning about
pro se representation, which it did, but nothing more. Id.
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Meeks determined that the defendant's right to counsel had been
violated by the trial court's finding of a waiver by conduct. 130 The
Sixth Circuit in King v. Bobby held that even though the
defendant actually signed a waiver of counsel, when he did not
expressly waive his right to representation, he was entitled to "the
minimum" Farettawarnings. 13
United States v. Garey offered a slightly different approach to
requiring warnings before finding a constructive waiver
issue,
the
but not necessarily a dialogue or colloquy with the defendant.132
The Eleventh Circuit also acknowledged the lack of guidance from
the United States Supreme Court. 3 3 The opinion includes strong,
clear language about the importance of protecting defendants'
right to counsel:
We continue to stress that when a right as fundamental as
the right to counsel is at stake, it is important for trial courts
to do all in their power to ensure every defendant, from the
most cooperative to the most obstreperous, is informed of the
risks of proceeding pro se and is prevented from waiving
counsel without sufficient knowledge of the protections he is
surrendering.

. .

. To that end, the best practice is for district

courts to begin by attempting to engage the defendant in a
full discussion of the dangers of self-representation whenever
a defendant expresses a desire to waive his right to counsel,
whether affirmatively or by his conduct.1 34
And so, while the Eleventh Circuit requires no magic words on the
subject, at least in relation to dilatory conduct, it does not allow
130 987 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 919 (1993). "The court
did not make Meeks aware of the dangers of proceeding pro se, nor does the record
indicate that he knew of them." Id.
131 King v. Bobby, 433 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1001 (2006).
132 United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
555 U.S. 1144 (2009) ("[A] Faretta-like monologue will suffice.... [I]t is enough for the
court to inform the defendant unambiguously of the penalties he faces if convicted and
to provide him with a general sense of the challenges he is likely to confront as a pro se
litigant.").
133 Id. at 1263 ("The Supreme Court has never confronted a case in which an
uncooperative defendant has refused to accept appointed counsel or engage in a
colloquy with the court. Consequently, the Court has never been asked to determine
whether a defendant may waive counsel without making an explicit, unqualified
request to represent himself.").
134 Id. at 1267.
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lower courts to impute understanding to defendants about the
consequences of their conduct or of their (eventual) loss of the
right to counsel.
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
for State v. Jones.135 In Jones, the trial court conducted a brief
colloquy during which Jones acknowledged that he had the right
to an attorney, but that he did not qualify for representation by a
public defender. 3 6 Although after appropriate warnings, he
agreed that he would represent himself, Jones told the trial court
that he considered himself "a sitting duck, basically a target"
without counsel.13 7 Although the appellate court held the record
did not support a conclusion that Jones had waived his right to
counsel, it held that Jones had forfeited it in his extremely dilatory
conduct and failure to engage counsel despite acknowledging the
risks of proceeding pro se. 3 8 The court in Wilkerson v. Klem
reached a similar conclusion, upholding a finding of forfeiture of
counsel without the defendant having received a full warning on
the record about the risks of self-representation.13 9
B. Loss of Counsel Not Requiring a Hearing
Not all of the cases in which certiorari was sought and denied
were cases in which a hearing was held, or later held to be
required. Although the defendant in Jones v. Walker repeatedly
asserted his wish for representation (as he requested new
counsel), the Eleventh Circuit found the "functional equivalent" of
a valid waiver.1 40 The dispositive fact in Jones-in seeming direct
contradiction to that Eleventh Circuit's holding in United States v.
State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3275 (2010).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 506.
138 Id.
139 Wilkerson v. Klem, 412 F.3d 449, 454 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1051
(2005). The Third Circuit noted that "[w]hile the Superior Court quoted this passage
from Wentz cast in terms of 'waiver,' it made clear that this was a case in which the
defendant had forfeited his right to counsel by his conduct and not one involving a
voluntary waiver of that right." Id. at 452.
140 Jones v. Walker, 540 F.3d 1277, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1670 (2009). "So long as a defendant knows the risks associated with selfrepresentation, it is irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether his understanding
comes from a colloquy with the trial court, a conversation with his counsel, or his own
research or experience." Id. at 1293.
1a5

136
137
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Garey (discussed supra)-was a finding of the defendant's
understanding of the risks of self-representation, regardless of the
source of that understanding.141 United States v. Hughes, for one,
acknowledged that a colloquy would have been "preferable" but
held that when the defendant delayed retaining counsel, "[t]he
facts and circumstances in this case support a valid waiver by
conduct." 142 Sullivan v. Pitcherlikewise upheld a waiver despite
explicit warnings.143 Under those circumstances, the Sixth Circuit
announced that "a formal inquiry is not a sine qua non of
constitutional waiver"144 and that "Sullivan was acutely aware of
his right to counsel and the risks of proceeding pro se, and his
waiver of that right and his decision to proceed in the face of such
risks was undeniably 'knowingly and intelligently' made."1 45
Several cases focused on the level of the defendant's
understanding and perceived manipulation of the system. In two
such cases, certiorari was denied after an appellate court upheld a
finding of waiver/forfeiture without a full warning or hearings. In
State v. Carruthers, the Supreme Court of Tennessee similarly
held that "an indigent criminal defendant may implicitly waive or
forfeit the right to counsel by utilizing that right to manipulate,
delay, or disrupt trial proceedings."14 6 Finding that Carruthers'
conduct and dilatory behavior had escalated with the successive
appointments of new counsel, and that he understood the dangers
of proceeding without counsel, the court explained "in situations
such as this one, a trial court has no other choice but to find that a
defendant has forfeited the right to counsel; otherwise, an
Id.; cf. United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317, 1324 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529
U.S. 1022 (2000).
143 Sullivan v. Pitcher, 82 F. App'x 162, 165 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S.
991 (2004).
141
142

144

Id.

Id. "In circumstances such as the instant one-when all the evidence supports
the conclusion that the Sixth Amendment is being used not as a shield but as a
sword--other courts have not hesitated to find waiver through conduct." Id. at 165-66
(citing United States v. Irorere, 228 F.3d 816, 826 (7th Cir. 2000)) (noting that "a
defendant may waive his right to counsel through his own contumacious conduct");
United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1110 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing waiver by
conduct as a "hybrid" situation that combines elements of waiver and forfeiture).
146 State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 549 (Tenn. 2000). On the other hand, that
court opined that "the distinction between these two concepts is slight" and found both
forfeiture and waiver in that case. Id.
145

2012]

GIDEON'S VUVUZELA

471

intelligent defendant 'could theoretically go through tens of courtappointed attorneys and delay his trial for years."'1 47 The court in
State v. Pride similarly upheld a finding of waiver of counsel after
the defendant failed to work with his public defender, failed to
officially hire private counsel, and failed to appear for trial. 148 The
fact that the court viewed Pride as having "knowingly attempted
to manipulate the court system" was dispositive.14 9 The court also
found the lack of a Faretta-type warning or waiver irrelevant,
since Pride had never indicated a wish to represent himself.1 5 0
Most denials of certiorari involving forfeiture were in cases
holding that no warning or hearing was required under those
extreme circumstances existing in each case: death threats
against counsel, kicking, punching, and the like. 15 In its own
consideration of the issue, the Third Circuit discussed the absence
of Supreme Court precedent. This was particularly relevant under
the circumstances of federal habeas review regarding whether
there was a prior decision of the Supreme Court involving facts
"materially indistinguishable" from those presented in this case
and whether the lower court's opinion was "contrary to . . . clearly
established Supreme Court law." 152 "It remains true," the court

explained, "that there are no Supreme Court decisions involving
forfeiture of the right to counsel and a fortiori no decisions
providing any clear guidance as to the 'standard to be applied
147 Id. at 550.
us State v. Pride, No. 2007-UP-544, 2007 S.C. App. LEXIS 48, at *12-13 (S.C. Ct.
App. Aug. 24, 2007), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3468 (2010).
149 Id.
150 Id. at *13-15 ("Additionally, we reject Pride's contention that his convictions
should be reversed because the trial judge failed to admonish him regarding the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation pursuant to [Faretta]. . . . At no point
did Pride indicate that he wanted to represent himself. Instead, he consistently
communicated to the court and his court-appointed attorney that he wanted to retain a
private attorney.").
151 Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2001). "Here, however, given the
Supreme Court's recognition that other important constitutional rights may be
forfeited based on serious misconduct, we cannot say that the state courts were
unreasonable in determining that the right to counsel could be forfeited based on
petitioner's physical assault on his attorney." Id. at 97; see also United States v.
Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 2003) ("A criminal defendant may, however, by
virtue of his actions forfeit his constitutional rights."); United States v. Leggett, 162
F.3d 237, 240, 250 (3d Cir. 1998).
152 Wilkerson v. Klem, 412 F.3d 449, 454 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied 547 U.S. 1051

(2006).
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before [it can be concluded that] a defendant's misconduct
153
warrants a forfeiture."'
Scholars, then, can make little of the meaning of these
repeated denials of certiorari, as denials are equally as likely to be
returned in cases requiring a more traditional waiver of counsel as
cases that allow forfeiture without offering the defendant a
warning or opportunity to adapt his behavior to an understanding
of potential consequences. Why is it, then, that such important
constitutional questions remain unaddressed by the Supreme
Court? These questions are now being raised often enough-and
on rather fundamental constitutional law issues-that it is
difficult to imagine the Court to be disinterested in the issue.
As state and federal appellate courts blunder on their own,
cases and circumstances raising significant constitutional
concerns persist. While many crave the attention of our High
Court, these questions cry out for guidance and clarity.
IV. MAKING SENSE OF THE PROBLEM: DOES THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL REALLY DEPEND ON GEOGRAPHY?
Evidently, court opinions on this topic range considerably
(which is not unusual, considering most jurisdictions approach
many criminal law matters with local flavor), with no forthcoming
magic bullet from the Supreme Court. The unique issue here is
that there is such variety in defining and approaching a
constitutional criminal law matter on which there exists otherwise
clear jurisprudence. Does conduct really create a set of problems
that justify deviation from precedent on waiver of counsel? Or are
these sets of cases aberrations crying out for a new set of legal
responses (if not a Supreme Court opinion)? Depending on the
location of an alleged crime, a defendant may be at risk for losing
his right to counsel with no prior information about potential
landmines, a warning and opportunity to modify behavior, or a
hearing.
Variety is one thing. Variety on a fundamental constitutional
question-particularly when definitions of the doctrines,
triggering behavior, and appropriate responses are so vague-is
troublesome.
'o

Id. at 454-55 (citing Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 152 (3d Cir. 2004)).
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Consider these scenarios as examples of the disparity of
approaches:
Scenario 1: Defendant does not want to waive counsel but is
not happy with counsel's performance. The court refers to the
dangers of proceeding pro se, but the defendant nevertheless fires
counsel on the eve of trial. Without further warning or a hearing,
he is forced to proceed pro se.
Scenario 2: Defendant-perhaps with untreated mental
health limitations-becomes frustrated with his attorney's failure
to file motions on his behalf or to visit him in jail. The attorneyclient relationship deteriorates. In a moment of desperation,
amidst the stress of a court hearing, he physically assaults his
counsel. He loses his right to counsel without warning from the
trial court or a recorded evidentiary hearing.
Scenario 3: Defendant is convinced he would present his
case better pro se than any attorney could. He is brought into
court for a hearing, and the trial court explains the benefits of
counsel, the pitfalls of proceeding without representation, and
requires him to assure the court of his understanding of the
attendant risks and to voluntarily relinquish his right to counsel.
He then proceeds into trial pro se.
Before a defendant can be required to navigate the criminal
process without counsel-either through delaying the process or
through more extreme misconduct-do these doctrines and
procedures ensure consistency with Supreme Court precedent and
our fundamental respect for a defendant's right to counsel?

A. What Are the Justifications,After All?
1. Courtroom Control
As many courts have explained, it is universally acceptedaxiomatic even-that defendants should not be able to assault
their attorneys or indefinitely delay a trial, and neither can state
nor federal budgets afford serial and indefinite appointment of
defense counsel to the indigent. 154 Appellate courts in nearly every

154 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1179-80 (Pa. 2009);
William Glaberson, Suit Over Legal Aid Advances in New York, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2010, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/nyregionl07court.html;

474

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 81:3

state and circuit are sympathetic and supportive of trial courts'
assertions of control when a defendant has attempted to hijack the
timetable of his case1 55 or meddle with a court's authority. Despite
a range of opinions about the propriety of a doctrine of forfeiture
or waiver by conduct, it is clear that defendants cannot be
permitted to play a "cat and mouse" game with a trial court. 156
But in their "analysis" of the issue-in the early cases that
first allowed these practices and in the later cases that have
adopted them-courts have confused a universal acknowledgment
of the problem with identifying the appropriate solution.
Consider, for example, the Bultron opinion, a fundamental
one on the subject: "Intentional misconduct for the purpose of
forcing counsel to withdraw so that the trial cannot proceed is
plainly obstructive to the administration of justice. The record
supports the legal conclusion that Bultron forfeited his right to
counsel by his conduct." 5 7 That the defendant's behavior is
unacceptable is clear. It should not necessarily follow that the only
appropriate legal response-or even the primary one-is the loss
of that defendant's right to representation. And yet many
appellate courts in both the state and federal court systems accept
the loss of the right to counsel as a mechanism by which courts
may assert authority over an unruly defendant. 5 8 To the limited
extent that forfeiture cases discuss the justification of the
doctrine, courts describe the duty to uphold and maintain order in
the court. The Means court emphasized the importance of
ensuring that the defendant receives his due process, but the
opinion also stressed that doctrine is used as a way of ensuring
safety and control in the courtroom. Looking more broadly at
forfeiture, the Supreme Court in Allen fell squarely on the side of
Adam Liptak, Defendants Squeezed by Georgia's Tight Budget, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
2010, at Al3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/us/06bar.htm1.
155 United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[A] court has
discretion to deny a request for a continuance if made in bad faith, for purposes of
delay or to subvert the judicial proceedings.").
156 State v. Slattery, 571 A.2d 1314, 1318 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
1'
Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 766 (Del. 2006).
11s Commonwealth v. Means, 907 N.E.2d 646, 659 (1VIass. 2009) ("Forfeiture is a
method of court room management in extraordinary circumstances"). "[Florfeiture or
waiver by conduct of that right is justified by the judge's powers to ensure safety and
control throughout the proceedings." Id. at 658 n.18 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 834-835 n. 46 (1975)).
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court's ability to control "disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly
defiant defendants."159 The view from that opinion is more in line
with the suppression of disorder rather than the protection of the
defendant's procedural rights. 160
An additional problem is that this doctrine reaches back to a
conduct-driven waiver of the right to a defendant's presence in a
trial rather than to his right to counsel.1 6 1 The Second Circuit's
Gilchrist6 2 opinion read the analogy into the Supreme Court's
opinions in Illinois v. Allen and Taylor v. United States, neither of
which mentions forfeiture (of counsel) by name.163 The Gilchrist
opinion read (or rather, extends) Allen to mean that the Supreme
Court did not indicate whether a warning was required in every
circumstance, leaving open the question of forfeiture of the right
to presence (i.e., a defendant's giving up the right to presence even
though the judge has not given the defendant a warning).1 64
In doing so, Gilchrist seems to ignore the differences between
the right to counsel and the right to presence at a trial; while both
are significant rights for criminal defendants, each connects to an
entirely different body of authority.165 Furthermore, there are
court opinions on the subject of a defendant's right to presence
requiring that before a court may conduct a trial in the
defendant's absence, it must ensure that the defendant had
119 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) ("It is essential to the proper
administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of
all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of
elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe
trial judges . . . must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each
case.").
160 Id.
16I

See id.

162

Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001).

16s See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973); Allen, 397 U.S. 337.
164 Incidentally, Gilchrist also appears to read Taylor-in which the Supreme Court
effectively held that Taylor's voluntary absence was the equivalent of a waiver of his
right to be present-to mean that the Supreme Court recognizes forfeiture of the right
to be present.
165 The criminal defendant's right to be present during his trial derives from the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and is considered a constitutional right.
Although a defendant does not have to be warned that he will lose the right to be
present during trial by voluntarily absenting himself from trial (meaning that the right
may be waived even in the absence of a warning), there has not been a finding that the
right may be totally forfeited. See United States v. Barnwell, 477 F.3d 844 (6th Cir.
2007).
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adequate notice of his right to be present, the nature of the
proceedings, and the consequences of the defendant's failure to
appear.166 Unfortunately, many of the cases related to forfeiture
or waiver, which do not demand on-record warnings or hearings,
ignore this fact. Instead, many announce that the solution is the
loss of the right to counsel and unceremoniously reiterate the
same line of cases used to justify the doctrine from its inception.' 6 7
The Gilchrist opinion has seemingly formed the basis of the
doctrine of forfeiture with more than seventy-five cases citing to
that opinion and relying on its authority.16 8
2. Fundamental Rights
It seems evident that many of these courts should have
undertaken a more thorough and searching analysis of this
problem and proposed a solution in light of the Supreme Court's
precedent in Johnson, Faretta, and the like. Those cases do not
cease to control questions of the loss of fundamental rights simply
because a defendant's conduct-rather than his verbal waiver-is
at issue.
In addition to being generally useful in a criminal trial
process, the right to counsel is a fundamental right.169 Its denial
through a court ruling-or through counsel's ineffectiveness 7 0-is
a structural error of such significant proportions that the extreme
solution of a new trial is the required corrective measure.' 7 '
166 See, e.g., United States. v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1972); Barnett v.
State, 512 A.2d 1071 (Md. 1986); People v. Smith, 497 N.E.2d 685 (N.Y. 1986); State v.
Jackson, 341 S.E.2d 375 (S.C. 1986).
167 See King v. Bobby, 433 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bauer, 956
F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1992); Waterhouse v. State, 596 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 1992); Jones v.
State, 536 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. 2000).
168 Figure based on citing references to Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.
2001), further narrowed to the terms "right to counsel."
169
Cf. Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending The Right of Self-Representation: An
EmpiricalLook at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423 (2007).
170 See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (extending the right to counsel
to those who receive a "suspended sentence that may 'end up in the actual deprivation
of a person's liberty"'); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (criminal
defendant not only has the right to assistance of counsel, he has the right to effective
assistance of counsel); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981) (right to conflict-free
counsel).
171 See Joseph A. Colquitt, Hybrid Representation:Standing the Two-Sided Coin on
Its Edge, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 60-61 (2003) ("The right to counsel is deemed
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Under the circumstances-balancing the harm of the loss of
counsel (no matter what label courts might have given it) against
the "burden" of warnings and acknowledgements on the record-it
is difficult to justify not requiring some sort of hearing. After all, a
hearing as envisioned in Johnson and Faretta are more than a
simple five-minute court session, wherein an official must recite
constitutional rights and warnings. Rather, it is the court's
opportunity to inform and educate a defendant about his rights
and
to
ascertain
whether
any
waiver
was
made
"understandingly."172

Considering, too, that delays, disruptions, and dismissals of
attorneys are all ways to express concern about the validity of the
process, it is worth introducing here that courts should have in
place a mechanism through which to evaluate legitimate pre-trial
(or at least pre-conviction) concerns about a counsel's
effectiveness. As one case expressed, "While a defendant may not
be forced to proceed to trial with incompetent or unprepared
counsel . . . a refusal without good cause to proceed with able

appointed counsel is a 'voluntary' waiver." 173 But if no hearing is
required in so many jurisdictions before a defendant loses his
right to counsel for inappropriately delaying, complaining about,
or railing at the process, courts may not intervene-pre-trial,
when intervention could make a difference 174-in the case of the
"unprepared" attorney. What, then, can be done if a defendant has
legitimate concerns about his counsel or the process? Surely there
is a way to better protect a court's power to control its courtroom
docket and procedures while effectively (and more consistently)
safeguarding the right to counsel (whether appointed or retained)?
Most courts are practiced at moving a case along or reminding a
defendant that, while he has the right to counsel's appointment,

'fundamental' . .. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has opined that it is as
essential as any right conferred on criminal defendants."); see also Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972) ("The assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the
very existence of a fair trial.").
172 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
us Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1976) (internal citations
omitted).
174 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984).
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he is not entitled to the counsel of his choosing.1 75 Allowing courts
flexibility in how that warning is afforded, yet requiring that it is
done when a defendant is at risk of entering a criminal process
without an advocate, addresses each of these considerations.
There may be a number of reasons why across-the-board
warnings about the consequences of dilatory, threatening, or
difficult conduct might seem unwarranted. First, hearings are
expensive: courts across the nation are busy enough already with
dockets overflowing and security and facilities being underfunded
or in disrepair. They are extra trouble. This may also be seen as
an over-reaction to a relatively rare problem-coddling a
defendant whose only goal is to rage against the machinery of the
judicial process.
In comparison to the number of total criminal defendants
processed by the courts each year, the most extreme stories
recounted here represent a relatively uncommon problem.
However, any national trend related to the loss of counsel without
a valid waiver is troublesome enough to warrant a decisive
solution. The United States Supreme Court has failed to offer one,
and so too have legislative bodies.
Although the issue demands more than a cost-benefit
analysis, what is the burden of a short hearing when the risk is
the violation of a fundamental right? Conduct is not so different
from words that courts are justified-without better guidance
from the High Court-in generating an entirely new set of tests to
examine the waiver of counsel.
A minimal time investment in a warning and
acknowledgment of risk may save decades of expensive litigation
down the road (as in the Georgia case described in the
Introduction). Once problems present themselves-a delay,
perhaps, or conflict with an attorney's advice-the judge could sua
sponte call the parties for a brief hearing during which she hears
reasons for the defendant's behavior (including, perhaps,
legitimate concerns about counsel's performance), warns the
defendant of the consequences of continuing the behavior, and
175 Maynard, 545 F.2d at 278 ("The right to counsel of one's choice is not absolute. A
court need not tolerate unwarranted delays, and may at some point require the
defendant to go to trial even if he is not entirely satisfied with his attorney.").
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accepts the defendant's knowing and intelligent consent to the
warning about dilatory tactics or potential threats or violence. A
brief hearing the length of a Farettawarning or a Boykin colloquy
is a small burden-especially when compared with the potential
loss of a fundamental constitutional right.176

B. Are Not These Fundamentally "Contemptuous"Defendants?
In many ways, both doctrines of implicit waiver and
forfeiture appear punitive-especially because in some cases
defendants lose not only their rights to counsel but their rights to
a preceding warning or hearing. Our legal system, however, has a
mechanism for dealing with unacceptable courtroom behavior by
lawyer or client: contempt. A thorough search for an intersection
of these doctrines has proven fruitless, which raises questions
about why forfeiture and implicit waiver doctrines stuck while
contempt sanctions in these cases seem to have been unexplored
(at least by appellate courts).
Traditionally, contempt proceedings have been the primary
"stick" available to trial and appellate courts overseeing difficult
parties or counsel.177 Contempt actions are common, and though
procedures vary greatly across jurisdictions, they are meant to
afford judges the power necessary to address misconduct, delay, or
other roadblocks to an efficient judicial process. 178 A trial judge, of
course, "may impose civil or criminal sanctions on both witnesses
and parties at trial" and have "broad discretion" to fashion
"narrowly tailored" remedies appropriate to the circumstances.1 79

See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Authority of the Trial Judge, 39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 597, 606
(2010).
178 Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional Limitations on the
Judicial Contempt Power-PartOne: The Conflict Between Advocacy and Contempt, 65
WASH. L. REV. 477, 480-81 (1990) ("Probably no more than a few minutes go by in this
country without an attorney being charged or threatened by a judge with contempt. In
Los Angeles County alone, one public defender is held in contempt or threatened
with contempt every week.").
179 Id.
at 606-07; see also Eric Fleisig-Greene, Why Contempt is Different: Agency
Costs and 'Petty Crime" in Summary Contempt Proceedings, 112 YALE L.J. 1223, 1246
(2003) C[C]ontempt power could be maintained . . . where the contemnor posed an
immediate threat of endangering those present or disrupting the court's functions.").
176
177
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This is particularly relevant in criminal cases, which generate the
highest number of contempt actions.18 0
Clients' physical assaults upon an attorney have been held to
be contempt of court-even when occurring in a courthouse
hallway. 18 ' If "calculated to impede, embarrass or obstruct the
[trial] court in the administration of justice," even violent behavior
occurring outside the presence of the court can fall into this
category of cases.18 2 If contempt can be used to assert control over
litigants' behavior even out of court, then its extension to cover
unrepresented defendants' behavior is not radical. If counsel may
be sanctioned for missing deadlines or failure to respond to other
direction from the court,' 8 3 then an unrepresented defendant's
delays can be adequately addressed by contempt powers as well.
The various doctrines all address the same behavior and
support improved courtroom control, but one makes much more
sense. Contempt actions still reprimand defendants for their
actions, but the right to counsel remains intact.
Not only is contempt the more traditional way of dealing with
misconduct that disrupts the judicial process, its application in the
implicit waiver/forfeiture context may be more analytically
consistent as well. Many courts impute to criminal defendants an
understanding of the consequences of violence or continued
disruptive conduct; however, this presupposes that defendants
180Raveson, supra note 178, at 480-81 ("Although no one seems to maintain
statistics on the frequency of contempt citations, anecdotal data suggests that the
threat and use of contempt against attorneys, particularly those representing criminal
defendants, is at an all time high and increasing.").
181 See People v. Clancy, 239 Ill. App. 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1926).
182 See id. at 373; Assault on Attorney as Contempt, 61 A.L.R.3d 500 (1975); cf. State
ex rel. Browning v. Jarrell, 192 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1972).
The trial court's adjudging the defendant to be in contempt for assaulting an
attorney in the court clerk's office was held erroneous . . . because the
evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
attorney was going to or coming from court for, or in respect to, a proceeding
had, or to be had, in that court, as required by the statute under which the
defendant had been convicted, since, said the court, the evidence did not show
what business, if any, the attorney had with the court at the time that the
assault occurred.
Assault on Attorney as Contempt, 61 A.L.R.3d 500 (1975) (emphasis added).
1s3 See Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 373
(2000) ("Contempt is intended as a remedial mechanism as well as a punishment for an
offense against the state"-through injunctions, fines, or terms of imprisonment.).
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could reasonably expect punishment for their behavior that would
extend beyond the typical sanctions of contempt. 184 That is, a
defendant may understand that a punch may constitute a tort or
crime, or potential exposure to contempt sanctions, but assuming
that criminal defendants understand these doctrines which elude
both scholars and courts is too great a logical assumption.

C. Recommended Procedures
Of course, the circumstances described in this Article present
complicated decisions for the courts considering themparticularly for the trial courts actually facing a difficult
defendant (as well as other parties, the substantive case before it,
and all other litigants demanding time and attention). This does
not, unfortunately, relieve courts of the responsibility to hold the
requiring a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
line
relinquishment of the right to counsel in criminal proceedings.
The most intellectually and doctrinally consistent response to
these situations is to keep misconduct in the realm where they
belong: contempt actions. Disruptive conduct-including in and
out of court violence or threatened violence against an attorneyis frequently sanctioned by trial courts through contempt actions,
which can be specially tailored to a defendant's circumstances, the
severity of the misconduct, and the stage of the proceedings.
Contempt proceedings, unlike the right to counsel, do not require
extensive colloquies, warnings, or special procedures: if a
defendant shows disrespect to the court's order and authority, he
can immediately be subjected to an additional contempt charge.
This solution to the real problems addressed in the doctrines of
implicit waiver of counsel and forfeiture is both more appropriate
and better-reasoned and gets to the heart of the underlying
concerns: courtroom control.
If, however, courts choose not to abandon the doctrines of
forfeiture or implicit waiver in favor of contempt proceedings, a
rather familiar hearing procedure would help ensure that courts
maintain control over their parties and their docket, while at the
184 Criminal contempt is traditionally imposed as a punishment for disobedience of
a legal commandment. It can result in lengthy imprisonment and substantial fines. Id.
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same time ensuring that a defendant's counsel is not lost without
necessary due process. That procedure is an on-record hearing,
which includes a colloquy about the defendant, the risks of his
continued behavior, the risks of continuing pro se, and a clear
warning about the doctrine of forfeiture or implicit waiver (and
the fact that continued misbehavior will lead to the loss of the
right to counsel). In those circumstances, a defendant must be
competent' 8 5 and demonstrate an understanding of the warnings
and the rights he stands to waive.
An additional but somewhat less desirable response may
involve adding simple warnings to a standard preliminary or first
appearance hearing colloquy. In those hearings, defendants are
typically explained that they hold important constitutional rights,
most of which are easily waived.18 6 To add a few simple sentences
explaining that dilatory behavior or violence toward counsel may
result in the loss of the right to counsel would neither incur
special expenses nor waste valuable time, but would still serve to
educate defendants about their rights and the possibility for
waiving them.18 7
1. A Warning and Hearing Disruptive or Dilatory Behavior
Short of failing to recognize a doctrine of forfeiture or implicit
waiver (as many jurisdictions have done), the only approach
consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent on the right to
counsel requires both warnings about the risks of proceeding pro
se and the risks of continued disruptive behavior. Of course, many
states that do allow for a waiver by conduct do follow this
185 Competence may be more of an issue in these cases than has manifested in the
appellate opinions. Of course, as with any constitutional right, a defendant must be
competent to understand and comply with the warnings he receives from the court, and
a competence inquiry may be both appropriate and pragmatic in the sorts of cases
described here. See Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966).
16 For example, in the Miranda warning itself, defendants are told of their right to
remain silent and of the consequences of their failure to remain so. This oversimplifies
the warnings somewhat, but the analogy is nonetheless apt; if a defendant is able to
waive his counsel through conduct, a warning that this can occur through a method
other than a verbal waiver could be appropriate.
187 On the other hand, while it might theoretically prevent the behavior discussed in
this Article, the power of suggestion is strong. For this reason, a hearing, once signs of
difficulty manifest, is both most practical and what is required under Faretta and
Johnson.
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procedure. Colorado offers an excellent example of how to address
this somewhat complicated situation while remaining true to
constitutional authority.
The Colorado Supreme Court has articulated so elegantly
what seems to be the best approach to the circumstance-and has
resolved a tension while considering interests of both trial courts
and defendants. The jurisdiction recognizes a waiver by conduct,
but makes clear:
A defendant may waive assistance of counsel either expressly
or impliedly through his or her conduct . . . . [however,]
[b]ecause there exists a strong presumption against the

waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, the trial court
has the duty to make a careful inquiry about the defendant's

right to counsel and his or her desires regarding legal
representation.

188

Most jurisdictions have resisted, for some reason, mandating
a particular colloquy. Perhaps if courts cannot agree about
whether a hearing is required in the first place, then mandatory
questions must be too much to ask. But, of course, Faretta and
Boykin-fundamental cases on waiver-do outline questions for
waiver colloquies that ensure at least a constitutional minimum.
As the Eighth Circuit eloquently writes, "the right to counsel
is a shield, not a sword," and "[a] defendant has no right to
manipulate his right for the purpose of delaying and disrupting
the trial," or any other proceeding.' 8 9 Still, if the right to counseland Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting and explaining
that right-is to be appropriately protected, a warning, on the
record, should be required before any waiver of that right can be
found. Eyes must still be "wide open."' 9 0
If an in-person hearing is too expensive, burdensome, or
otherwise impractical, the Massachusetts courts have solved this

People v. Alengi, 148 P.3d 154, 159 (Colo. 2006).
United States v. Stewart, 20 F.3d 911, 917 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations
omitted) (a defendant attempting to delay the proceedings received warnings about his
behavior and was found to have waived his right to counsel).
188
189

19

See id.
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problem by warning defendants via videoconference. 1 9 ' With
improved technology becoming less complicated and expensive,
this may offer a solution, making compliance with Faretta
somewhat simpler.
Many courts, as described infra, do hold a hearing at the first
sign of delay or difficulty, though the outcomes of these
proceedings are mixed. Many jurisdictions, however, stop short of
offering a hearing or warning in the case of physical violence or a
threat of violence against an attorney, and a skeptic might assume
this is because of the sudden and unpredictable nature of these
cases or the defendants described therein. This mistakes the issue.
First, until there is Supreme Court precedent to the contrary, this
sidesteps the existing law requiring a knowing and intelligent
waiver of counsel. Second, many (if not most) of the cases that
culminated in violence began with lower-level delay or disruption
of the process and offered earlier opportunities for warning or
intervention. 1 9 2 There were opportunities, in these cases, for a
court to offer warnings-both about the risks of the continued
misconduct and the risks of continuing pro se-as described above.
Finally, at least one jurisdiction has offered a very workable model
for responding to a defendant who has attacked his lawyer and
preventing waiver without warning. In its Holmes case, Tennessee
offered a rational, practical solution in these circumstances; the
solution suggested is both consistent with protection of the
defendants' constitutional rights and a rational response to a
heated, emotional situation.19 3 Again, there may not be "magic

191 See Commonwealth v. Means, 907 N.E.2d 646, 651-52 (Mass. 2009) (finding
forfeiture of the right to counsel but affording a videoconferencing hearing for a
defendant).
192 See, e.g., United States. v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 2004); State v. Rasul,
167 P.3d 1286 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); King v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 585 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003); State v. Montgomery, 530 S.E.2d 66 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
193 The Tennessee
Supreme Court gives another recommended procedure for
dealing with potential forfeiture in future cases. So long as the query on whether the
defendant has been appropriately warned is a dispositive concern in this procedure,
this is an excellent method for addressing such circumstances.

For the benefit of trial courts in future cases where a criminal defendant is
alleged to have physically attacked his lawyer, we suggest that the following
procedure be followed. Counsel should be allowed to withdraw if requested.
Then, unless the attack occurred in full view of the court, the trial court
should conduct promptly an evidentiary hearing, with the defendant present
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words" or a set colloquy that must be followed in every case.
However, to suggest that a defendant's violent conduct makes
compliance with the constitution impossible ignores a trial court's
range of optional responses and ability to craft a solution
appropriate to a defendant's unique concerns (and methods of
manifesting them).
2. A General Warning at First Appearance
Additionally (not alternatively), if a warning could be added
to an already-existing court appearance-say, a first appearance
hearing, when defendants typically receive information about the
right to remain silent, their right to appointed counsel, and the
like-the only additional expense involved is twenty extra seconds
of the judge's breath.
If protection of defense attorneys from potential harm is a
factor (in part) driving a policy allowing the forfeiture of the right
to counsel, would not a warning at the beginning of the process do
more to prevent this? Forfeiture is almost by definition a
reactionary response-and if a defendant does not understand the
consequences of his actions, then forfeiture or waiver is no
deterrent. The addition of a brief warning that "egregious conduct"
can form the basis of a waiver of counsel could help prevent the
and permitted to testify, and make findings of fact on the basis of the proof
presented. The trial court should determine, on the basis of the facts found,
whether the defendant engaged in "extremely serious misconduct" sufficient
to justify the extraordinary sanction of an immediate forfeiture (or implicit
waiver) of counsel. In making this determination, the trial court should
consider (a) the stage of the proceedings; (b) whether the lawyer attacked is
initial counsel or is a successor to other lawyers allowed to withdraw due to
problems with the defendant; (c) whether the defendant had previously been
warned about the potential loss of counsel as a result of misbehavior; (d)
whether the defendant engaged in the misconduct deliberately and with the
aim of disrupting, delaying, or otherwise manipulating the proceedings; (e)
the degree of violence involved and the seriousness of any injury inflicted;
and (f) whether measures short of forfeiture will be adequate to protect
counsel. If the trial court concludes that the defendant did not commit
"extremely serious misconduct" so as to justify a forfeiture, the trial court
should (1) appoint new counsel (assuming prior counsel withdrew); (2) inform
the defendant of the potential consequences of future misbehavior and the
risks of proceeding pro se; and (3) order such measures as are necessary to
protect new counsel from future misbehavior by the defendant.
State v. Holmes, 302 S.W.3d 831, 848 (Tenn. 2010).
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problematic behavior in the first place. After all, courts must be
careful not to make too many assumptions about a defendant's
understanding. On the other hand, any warning must be clear
enough to put a defendant on notice, while stopping short of
suggesting violence in the first place or inhibiting a defendant
from complaints about his attorney's performance (in a more
appropriate form).
Practices differ among the state or federal jurisdictions, but
in Georgia, all defendants receive information about their
constitutional rights in a hearing to be held not later than
seventy-two hours after an arrest.194 At this first appearance, the
judicial officer is required to inform the defendant about the
charges against him and about his Miranda rights.1 9 5 In addition
to offering further information about bail (if applicable) and
making cursory decisions about the existence of probable cause,
defendants are given information about their right to counsel and
the procedures through which counsel may be appointed.1 96 This
could be an appropriate opportunity to explain that, although
accused of a crime and entitled to the assistance of counsel, the
right to counsel can be "waived" or "forfeited" under circumstances
of a defendant's delay or as a result of a defendant's threatening
behavior. It would add no perceptible length to such a hearing
and-coupled with a later warning if appropriate-could prevent
unconstitutional, involuntary loss of the right to counsel (if not the
offending behavior itself).
3. Standby Counsel is Not Constitutionally Sufficient
A number of courts-perhaps out of discomfort with a blanket
loss of counsel after a defendant disrupts the trial process but yet
unwilling to offer a full hearing under the circumstances-have
adopted alternatives. Some "recommend" but do not require a
hearing before a defendant can lose his right to counsel. 197 Others
require an examination of the entire record (as a whole) to
determine whether there is evidence that the defendant

194

GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 26.1.

195

Id.

196

Id.

197

See State v. Watson, 900 A.2d 702, 714-15 (Me. 2006).
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independently understood the rights he stood to lose.' 9 s A third
approach, which is relatively common in the federal courts, even
when a defendant has expressly waived his right to counsel, offers
standby or "shadow" counsel to the defendant to assist him during
his trial. Each of these is constitutionally insufficient-and may in
fact cause more confusion in the long run.
The appointment of standby representation does not fully
address the disconnect that exists between a defendant's right to
be represented by an attorney at trial and a trial court's
determination that the defendant has validly waived or forfeited
his or her right to an attorney. Some authority proposes that
defendants may be appointed standby counsel before acquiring a
valid waiver, thus violating the defendant's right of selfrepresentation if he or she does not expressly affirm that right. 9 9
The use of standby counsel-as opposed to actual
representation-is improper if a defendant has not validly waived
his right to counsel. While some authority suggests that standby
counsel should be appointed in circumstances of uncertainty, 200 it
is possible that a defendant will not receive warnings regarding
the dangers of self-representation because the court presumes
that standby counsel eliminates the need for valid waivers.
Further, appointing standby counsel may violate a pro se
defendant's rights if appointment "yield[s] a presentation to the
jury that directly contradicts the approach undertaken by the
defendant." 20 1 The defendant has a right to retain actual control
over his or her case; this is the core of the Faretta right. Finally,
because "multiple voices for the defense could confuse the message
the defendant

wishes

to convey . . . a

standby

attorney's

participation would be barred when it would destroy the jury's
perception that the defendant is representing himself."202

198 See Jones v. State, 536 S.E.2d 511, 514 (Ga. 2000).

19 People v. Nieves, 442 N.E.2d 228, 235 (Ill. 1982); State v. Chavis, 644 P.2d 1202,
1207 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
200 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
201 United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1066 (2002).
202 Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 186 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Few, perhaps, are particularly outraged that a defendant (by
definition, of course, standing trial for criminal activity) might
lose his right to counsel for belligerent, contrarian, or perhaps
even violent behavior. But to lose counsel without warnings on the
record should at least prove uncomfortable to those who recognize
the rationale in Johnson, Gideon, Faretta, and others in that
company.
And if not outrage or discomfort, then, perhaps even the most
skeptical can perceive an irony here. A defendant facing a
criminal trial attempts to proceed without counsel-wishing to
conduct his trial pro se. In that circumstance, under guidance and
directive from the United States Supreme Court, a trial court is
required to give the defendant particularized warnings, including
describing the usefulness of a lawyer's skill and counsel, the traps
of courtroom and evidentiary procedure, and the penalties should
he be found guilty.
On the other hand, consider the person facing those same
charges but who never vacillates in his understanding of the
importance of counsel. He accepts appointed counsel (or retains
his own counsel, assuming he is financially able to do so). At some
point, dissatisfied with his counsel-perhaps his attorney has
mapped an unacceptable strategy for the case, has failed to meet
with or identify witnesses, or has otherwise failed to prepare a
defense in a satisfactory way-that defendant requests new
representation. If the trial court finds that the defendant's actions
are "dilatory" or otherwise disruptive to the process, that
defendant could find himself facing a trial or other court
proceedings on his own and without an advocate.
If the understood punishment here in the case above is
contempt for punching the attorney, then why would implicit
waiver and forfeiture, two notions not common to uneducated
defendants, be understood as punishment as well? Most
competent defendants may expect some consequences after
threatening or carrying out violence against their counsel, but
those punishments take different forms: contempt proceedings,
civil suit, and criminal charges. And since they are by definition
on trial for "bad behavior" and entitled to (appointed) counsel, why
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would any such defendant presume that bad behavior could
likewise lead to the loss of counsel?
The truth is that very little related to protections or
procedures for those charged with crimes changes because of
widespread public outrage. What should attract attention,
though-and action-is this inconsistency among jurisdictional
approaches and inconsistency with clearly established federal law
on the loss of counsel. If criminal defendants can lose their
guaranteed right to counsel because of unpopular or impolite
behavior-without a hearing, without a warning, without a
"knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" assent that continuation of
disruptive behavior could lead to the loss of representation-then
Gideon means little and Farettamakes no sense.
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